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NOTES
SALES-BREACHES OF WARRANTY-ABSOLUTE RESPONSIBILITY.-
Tort is a term more comprehensive than breach of contract. It covers
more kinds of injuries. Innumerable interests of individuals may be af-
fected by the acts of others. If responsibility is imposed upon the actors
they are tortfeasors. It is assumed to be the unusual situation where
responsibility is imposed upon the actor who has not been at fault. In the
field contract the interests affected are most often the interests in the
bargains negotiated between the parties affected. One person's breach
has prevented the other's realizing upon the bargain as planned. But
the breach may affect other interests than the interests in the bargain.
Whether the party in default will have to compensate the other party
for the injuries to those other interests depends upon what the parties
have intended to protect by their bargain.' Responsibility in these in-
stances is comparable to responsibility within the field of tort. But
there is, apparently, this difference. It is unnecessary to make any in-
quiry beyond the fact of the breach and the intention of the parties;
fault, that is, carelessness or intent on the part of the party in default
to cause the particular injury or any like it, is not important.
The extension of the sellers' responsibilities for breaches of war-
ranty in contracts for the sale of goods illustrates the attitude of the
courts in these cases that may be described figuratively as "quasi-
delictual." At the early common law the slogan was "let the buyer
beware." 2 So long as the buyer got the specific horse that he had bar-
gained for the seller was not in default. The horse might be worthless,
but to get any relief at all the buyer had to show that the seller had
misled him. He had to make out a case against the seller as against
a tortfeasor. But the courts by decision were building upon the idea
of express and implied warranty to give the buyer more protection be-
cause of the seller's default, and these decisions were finally codified
under the generalizations of the Sales Act.3
: Miller, Dantages, Responsibility, and Loss of Profits (1932) 17 Marq. Law
Rev. 3.
2 In Chandelor v. Lopus, Cro. Jac. 4, 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (1625), the court held, in
the sale of a precious jewel, that a bare affirmation that it was a bezor stone
without warranting it to be so was no basis for a cause of action.3 Bigge v. Parkinson, 7 H. & N. 955 (1862) (which created the exception)
Frost v. Aylesbury Dairy Co., [1905] 1 K.B. 608; Emerson v. Binghan, 10
Mass. 197, 6 Am. Dec. 109 (1813) ; Bishop v. Weber, 139 Mass. 411, 52 Am.
Rep. 715, 1 N.E. 154 (1885) ; Van Bracklin v. Fonda, 12 Johns 468, 7 Am. Dec.
339 (1815); Craft v. Parker, W. & Co., 96 Mich. 245, 55 N.W. 812, 21 L.R.A.
139 (1893) ; Weideinan v. Keller, 171 Ill. 93, 49 N.E. 210 (1897). The courts
avoided the danger of burdening the dealer in canned foods with a harsh
responsibility by carrying the implied warranty back as far as the manufac-
turer, regardless of his want of privity with the ultimate purchaser. Daier v.
Van Camnp Packing Co., 189 Ia. 775, 176 N.W. 382, 17 A.L.R. 649 (1920);
Hertzler v. Manshunn, 228 Mich. 416, 200 N.W. 155 (1924). The court, in
Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790, 59 A.L.R. 1164 (1927), ex-
pressed the present tendency of the law in this regard as follows: "Implied
warranty is not one of the contractual elements of the agreement. It is not
one of the essential elements to be stated in the contract, nor does its effective
application or existence rest or depend on the affirmative intention of the
parties. * * * Because of the acts of the parties it is imposed by law. The
doctrine of implied warranty should be extended rather than restricted." See
also, Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105, 74 A.L.R.
339 (1931).
NOTES
What constitutes a warranty has been defined by statute. The Uni-
form Sales Act declares any affirmation of fact or any promise by the
seller relating to the goods to be an express warranty if the natural
tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to pur-
chase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying'thereon.'
However, no affirmation of the value of the goods, nor any statement
purporting to be a statement of the seller's opinion only is construed
to be a warranty. Implied warranties have also been defined by the
Act.'
The courts have used the Sales Act to help them clarify the sellers'
duties arising from both express and implied warranties. The present
rules place an almost absolute liability upon the vendor for injuries
suffered by'the vendee because the article purchased has not been as
represented.' In actions such as these the vendor has little if anything
in the way of a defense to avert judgment. Unless he can show that he
did not know the purpose for which the article was to be used, or that
he did not actually make the representation alleged, or that the vendee
was not in fact induced to purchase as a result of his representations,
he cannot defeat the action. The vendor may have been extremely dili-
gent and careful in ascertaining the condition of the thing sold, and
it may have been impossible for him to know or foresee that the article
might not ultimately be as represented, but these facts would be of no
avail as defenses. The apparent harshness thus imposed is justified by
the'courts on the ground of public policy and the general welfare.
In the recent case of Lentz v. Omar Baking Co.,7 the plaintiff, a cripple,
4 Wis. Stats. (1933) § 121.12.
5Wis. Stats. (1933) § 121.15 provides: "Subject to the provisions of this act
and of any statute in that behalf, there is no implied warranty or condition
as to the quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied under
a contract to sell or a sale, except as follows:
(1) Where the buyer, expressly, or by implication, makes known to the
seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it
appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment (wheth-
er he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied
warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose.
(2) Where the goods are bought by the description from a seller who
deals in goods of that description (whether he be the grower or man-
ufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall
be of merchantable quality.
(3) If the buyer has examined the goods, there is no implied warranty as
regards defects which such examination ought to have revealed.
(4) In the case of a contract to sell or a sale of a specified article under
its patent or other trade name, there is no implied warranty as to its
fitness for any particular purpose.
(5) An implied warranty or condition as to quality or fitness for a par-
ticular purpose may be annexed by the usage of trade.
(6) An express warranty or condition does not negative a warranty or
condition implied under this act unless inconsistent therewith."
6 Tyler v. Moody, 111 Ky. 191, 63 S.W. 433, 49 A.S.R. 406, 54 L.R.A. 417 (1902);
Shuman v. Heater, 76 Neb. 119, 106 N.W. 1042 (1900); Rollins v. Northern
Land Co., 134 Wis. 447, 114 N.W. 819 (1908); Ireland v. L. K. Ligett Co.,
243 Mass. 243, 137 N.E. 371 (1922); Smith v. Denholm & McKay Co., 192
N.E. 631, Mass. (1934).
7 (Neb. 1934) 252 N.W. 419. In Wells v. Oldsmobile Co. of Oregon, (Ore. 1934)
35 P. (2d) 232 the court defines the essential allegations of a complaint for
breach of warranty as including a statement of the consideration for the war-
ranty; the allegation of the warranty; the reliance thereon the breach of the
warranty, and the resultant damages.
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had purchased a horse from the defendant baking company. The de-
fendant's agents had been informed by the plaintiff's daughter that he
required a gentle horse. They assured her that the horse, which had
been used for several years on bakery routes, was a gentle horse. When
the plaintiff hitched the horse to a buggy, the horse ran away, broke
the side of a barn and injured the plaintiff. The court held the defend-
ant company responsible in damages for the injury saying that, under
the Sales Act, there had been an express warranty that the horse was
gentle. The Lentz case illustrates this arbitrary interpretation of the
law. It might readily be argued that the defendant company had no
means of knowing the hidden quirk in the temperament of the animal
sold. Actually, the horse had been exceptionally well-behaved while in
the possession of the company. There was no negligence on the part of
the company, nor was there any intent to misrepresent. Usually where
the buyer is justified in relying on the seller's statements, the seller
occupies or assumes a position of superior knowledge.8 In the Lentz
case, however, representations made by the defendant were substan-
tiated by the facts as known to it. The effect of the court's decision was
to make the defendant virtually an insurer of the vendee against all
accidents caused by the horse sold.9
The courts will not disregard the elements of negligence entirely,
however. The defense of contributory negligence is still available where
it can in fact be shown that the negligence of the plaintiff was the
cause, or at least one of the causes of the injury.10 Similarly, where
the breach of the warranty is not a cause of the injury, the courts will
not allow a recovery12
Under the common law action of false warranty with a count in
deceit, it was necessary for a buyer to contest the question of scienter
with the vendor.' 2 Where the buyer sounded his cage in tort for the
breach of warranty, he was forced to prove the negligence of the de-
fendant. The evidence in the case was very often completely in the
SMeshbesher v. Chamellene Oil & Mfg. Co., 107 Minn. 104, 119 N.W. 428, 13
Am. St. Rep. 441 (1909); Conkling v. Standard Oil Co., 138 Ia. 596, 116 N.W.
822 (1908) ; Tituts v. Poole, 145 N.Y. 414, 40 N.E. 228 (1895).
9 See, Consolidated Pipe Co. v. Gunn, (Cal. 1934) 35 P. (2d) 350, in which the
court, admitting an implied warranty in the sale of a casing shoe for use in
drilling a water well, refused to sustain an action for breach of warranty
where the evidence showed the possibility of damaging the shoe by its use,
although not originally defective. The court says, at p. 352, "If the appellant's
contention is sustained in this case, it simply means that the law implied, not
a warranty of reasonable capacity, but a guaranty that the article would prove
capable of doing the work; in other words, the result would be that the re-
spondent would become an insurer." The courts have limited the severity of
the rule in those cases where the seller is merely a dealer in goods of known
and described kind, and liability has been denied. Bieglow v. Maine Central R.
Co., 110 Me. 105, 85 Atl. 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 627 (1913); Webster v. Ronano
Engineering Corporation, (Wash. 1934) 34 P. (2d) 428.
IONelson v. Win. H. Ziegler Co., Inc., 190 Minn. 313, 251 N.W. 534 (1933),
where it was held that the question of contributory negligence in an action for
personal injuries resulting from a breach of warranty was one to be decided
by the jury.
"1Journal Co. v. Simons, 112 Wis. 548, 88 N.W. 580 (1902); Cavanaugh v.
Spring Valley Stock Farv Co., 206 Ia. 893, 221 N.W. 512 (1928).12 Fields v. Brown, 160 N.C. 295, 76 S.E. 8 (1912); See, Flessher v. Carstens
Packing Co., 93 Wash. 48, 160 Pac. 14 (1916); Nash v. Minnesota Title Ins.
Co., 163 Mass. 574, 40 N.E. 1039, 28 L.R.A. 735, 47 Am. St. Rep. 489 (1895).
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control of the seller thus making a recovery highly improbable. Often
too, the expense of making out a case showing negligence was so great
as to be prohibitive in actions involving only small amounts. In addi-
tion, it was difficult to attach responsibility to the person primarily re-
sponsible for the defect in the article purchased.13 Under the present
law, however, the buyer is amply protected by allowing a recovery for
his injuries in contract for breach of warranty, without the necessity
of proving either scienter or negligence.
From the point of view of policy it makes little difference whether
the seller who is at fault be held responsible on the theory' of tort or
contract. It is important to know whether the conduct of the seller will
have any effect upon the scope of his responsibility. Perhaps a seller
should be held to a responsibility more strict than that of a donor,
lender, or even the manufacturer, where the use of the product has re-
sulted in physical injuries to the person of the buyer. It is a process of
adjusting losses between actor and sufferer. Certainly there has been
a growing tendency to use the scheme of implied warranties as an ex-
cuse for extending the limits of the seller's responsibility.
AARoN HoRoWITZ.
13 Williston, Sales (1924) Vol. I, 469. "If the buyer cannot recover from the
seller he cannot recover from anyone for the defective character of the goods
which he has bought. The wrong done by the sale of defective materials to
the manufacturer who later sold the goods cannot form the basis of action
by the ultimate buyer. Consequently, the real wrongdoer, who has caused the
ultimate injury, escapes. On the other hand, if the manufacturer is held to
an absolute liability irrespective of negligence, it will unquestionably increase
the degree of care which he will use, and if in any case he is compelled to pay
damages for breach of warranty, where the real cause of the defect was in-
ferior material, which he himself innocently purchased, he will have a remedy
over against the persons who sold him this inferior material, and his damages
will include whatever he himself has had to pay for breach of warranty. Thus
the loss will be borne ultimately by the person who should be held respon-
sible." See, Patterson v. Orangeburg Fertilized Co., 117 S.C. 140, 108 S.E. 401,
405 (1921).
